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WATERS AND WATERCOURSES -

EMI-

wATER AS A "TAKING" OF PRIVATE PROP-

city for damages caused his land by the
continual discharge of raw sewage into the river about one-half mile above
plaintiff's land. The pollution rendered the water of the river unfit for domestic
use and deleterious to health. Held, that although the plaintiff failed to allege
the necessary elements for a tort action against a municipality, under the Wash-
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ington statute,1 he stated a valid cause of action for damages under article I,
section l 6 of the Washington Constitution which states that "No private property
shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation
having first been made •.••" Snavely v. City of GoUendale, (Wash. I 941)
I 17 P. (2d) 221.
Although a riparian owner has the right to have a stream flow over his land
in its natural purity,2 he cannot complain of unavoidable pollution caused by any
reasonable use of said stream by the upper riparian owners.8 An unreasonable
use of the stream by private riparian owners may be enjoined as a nuisance/ or
the wrongdoer may be subjected to a damage action for any injury caused the
lower riparian owners. 6 Generally the fact that the riparian owner is a municipality does not give it the right to drain sewage into a stream to the injury of
lower riparian owners, because such a use of the stream is not considered reasonable. 6 However, in at least one case there is some indication that public necessity and social welfare may give a municipality the right to drain sewage into
the usual and naturally adapted conduit although a private owner would not have
that right.7 Several states have expressly or impliedly conferred this right of
drainage upon municipalities by statute,8 but most state courts construe these
conforring statutes strictly against the municipalities.9 Furthermore, even though
a municipality is given authority by statute thus to drain its sewage, it cannot exercise this authority in such manner as to amount to an unconstitutional "taking"
or "damaging" of the lower riparian owner's property. If the municipality is
guilty of such a "taking," it can be protected only if the power of eminent doWash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1933), § 9481.
Attorney General v. Paterson, 58 N. J. Eq. 1, 42 A. 749 (1899); Drake v.
Lady Ensley Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 102 Ala. 501, 14 So. 749 (1893); Peterson v.
Santa Rosa, 119 Cal. 387, 51 P. 557 (1897); I LEWis, EMINENT DoMAIN, 3d ed.,
§ 77 ( 1909).
8
Attorney General v. Paterson, 58 N. J. Eq. 1, 42 A. 749 (1899); Attorney
General ex rel. Wyoming Township v. City of Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 141
N. W. 890 (1913). The case of Barnard v. Sherley, 135 Ind. 547, 34 N. E. 600,
35 N. E. 117 (1893), has a fine discussion of reasonable use with respect to pollution.
4, 1 LEWIS, EMINENT DoMAIN, 3d ed.,§ 83 (1909).
IS Id.
6
Platt v. Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531, 45 A. 154 (1900); Grey ex rel. Simmons
v. Paterson, 58 N. J. Eq. 1, 42 A. 749 (1899); 1 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, § 138 (1904).
7
City of Valparaiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N. E. 1062 (1900), annotated
in 48 L. R. A. 707 (1900).
8
In City of Richmond v. Test, 18 Ind. App. 482, 48 N. E. 610 (1897), authority to drain sewage was inferred from the general power of municipalities to construct
sewers and outlets in connection with the fact that the stream was the only practicable
outlet. In Joplin Consolidated Mining Co .v. Joplin, 124 Mo. 129, 27S.W.406 (1894),
authority to discharge sewage into the stream was inferred from authority to establish
public sewers along the principal courses of drainage. In Vogt v. Grinnell, 133 Iowa
363, 110 N. W. 603 (1907), however, the court held that the legislature must give
municipalities express authority to discharge sewage into the stream.
9 Mack v. Town of Craig, 68 Colo. 337, 191 P. IOI (1920).
1
2
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main has also been conferred upon it by the state constitution.10 Otherwise
a lower riparian owner can enjoin the discharge whenever it becomes a nuisance
to his property.11 This may easily leave the municipality without a satisfactory
and inexpensive means of sewage disposal.12 The most practical solution is for
the states to give their municipalities the right to dispose of sewage regardless of
injury to lower riparian owners and to allow them to exercise the power of
eminent domain in cases where the use amounts to an unconstitutional "taking"
or "damaging" of property, depending upon the breadth of the terms of the state
constitution. In the principal case, Washington had provided adequately for its
municipalities; and the plaintiff was able to recover for his injuries under the
law of eminent domain. Public health and social necessity in these sewage
disposal cases demand more consideration than the private rights of the lower
riparian owners; and when the measure of recovery is .fixed at the diminution in
the market value of the land,18 the injured landowner would appear to be adequately compensated for any loss suffered by him.
B roo ks F • Crahtree
10
l LEWIS, EMINENT DoMAIN, 3d ed., § 371 (1909); Strain v. Cities Service
Gas Co., 148 Kan. 393, 83 P. (2d) 124 (1938); Platt v. Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531,
45 A. 154 (1900). Many state constitutions, including that of Washington, allow a
"taking" or "damaging" of private property for a public use if due compensation is
made, whereas the Federal Constitution (Fifth Amendment) and those of several states
are limited to read that there shall be no "taking" of property without compensation.
Smith v. Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S. W. 907 (1899); Butchers' Ice & Coal Co. v.
Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 54, 27 A. 376 (1893); New Odorless Sewerage Co. v. Wisdom,
30 Tex. Civ. App. 224, 70 S. W. 354 (1902); Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215
N. C. 745, 3 S. E. (2d) 267 (1939); Aleman v. Sewerage & Water Board of New
Orleans, 196 La. 428, 199 So. 380 (1940); Winn v. Village of Rutland, 52 Vt. 481
(1880); Milhous v. State Highway Dept., 194 S. C. 33, 8 S. E. (2d) 852 (1940);
Sewer Improvement District No. l of Sheridan v. Jones, 199 Ark. 534, 134 S. W.
(2d) 551 (1939). However, in the latter case a "taking" is often interpreted to include
every act which injuriously affects property rights. Smith v. Silverton, 71 Ore. 379,
142 P. 609 (1914); Winn v. Village of Rutland, 52 Vt. 481 (1880). Judge Cooley,
in Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296 (1877), lays down the rule that a municipal
corporation is responsible, like an individual, when it invades private property; and if
it discharges sewage on private property, it is answerable in damages; and the Hooding of
private property is as much a taking of the property as any other appropriation would be.
It should be noted that in cases involving public waters, this problem of eminent
domain does not arise because the riparian owners have no rights in the stream itself.
Sayre Co. v. Newark, 60 N. J. Eq. 361, 45 A. 985 (1900); Attwood v. Bangor, 83
Me. 582, 22 A. 466 (1890). Where the tide ebbs and Hows, the title of the riparian
owners extends only to the high water mark, and the public owns the stream bed. Above
the ebb and How, the riparian owner has title to the middle of the stream.
11
Attorney General ex rel. Wyoming Township v. City of Grand Rapids, 175
Mich. 503, 141 N. W. 890 (1913); Mack v. Town of Craig, 68 Colo. 337, 191 P.
IOI (1920); Smith v. Silverton, 71 Ore. 379, 142 P. 609 (1914).
12
In some cases, it has become necessary that the municipality establish a sewage
disposal plant to take care of its sewage. In individual cases, this could prove both expensive and impractical, especially when a natural course of drainage was located nearby.
18
King v. Rolla, 234 Mo. App. 16, 130 S. W. (2d) 697 (1939); Aleman v.
Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 196 La. 428, 199 So. 380 (1940); McDaniel v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 P. 899 (1913).

